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Antisuit Injunction and Notice of Intervention
and Preclusion: Complementary Devices to
Prevent Duplicative Litigation
Edward F. Sherman*
How to overcome the expense, delay, and possible
inconsistency of mass duplicative litigation is one of the most
pressing issues in civil procedure today. Mass duplicative
litigation arises when a large number of related cases are
based on the same transaction, conduct, condition, or product
and are pursued separately.' The primary mechanisms for
reducing mass duplicative litigation are the procedural devices
used to aggregate similar cases-j~inder,~ consolidation,3 and
class action. These aggregative devices, however, are not
themselves capable of preventing all duplicative litigation that
can interfere with the disposition of the aggregated case. A
court may need, for example, to enjoin the parties, or
nonparties with similar claims, from prosecuting their cases in
other courts if those suits would undermine the resolution of
the aggregated case. A court may also desire to ensure that
nonparties with similar claims who have been given an

* Edward Clark Centennial Professor of Law, University of Texas School of
Law. A.B., 1959, Georgetown University; LL.B., 1962, S.J.D., 1981, Harvard Law
School. By way of disclosure, the author was on the Members Advisory Group of
the ALI Complex Litigation Project and testified as an expert witness on the
fairness of the global settlement to the third-party defendant class in Ahearn v.
Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D. 505 (E.D. Tex. 1995), infra notes 114-17, 150-53.
1. Examples would include mass accidents (e.g., plane crashes), harm to the
environment (the escape of toxic substances), injury from defective products (the
unanticipated effects of taking prescription drugs or using products), and damage
caused by the same wrongful conduct (stock investors subjected to security fraud or
consumers to illegal financial practices).
2. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19 (mandatory joinder); FED. R. CIV. P. 20
(permissive joinder).
3. See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) ("When actions involving a common question of
law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of
any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions
consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may
tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.").
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opportunity to join the aggregated case cannot later challenge
the judgment, thus preventing future duplicative litigation.
These results may be accomplished through two complementary procedural devices-the antisuit injunction and notice of
intervention and preclusion. Both devices are incorporated into
the aggregative scheme proposed by the American Law
Institute's Complex Litigation P r o j e ~ t . ~
The ALI Proposal relies on the aggregative scheme of
consolidation, supplemented by expanded opportunities for
and "tran~fer"~
to bring similar cases into
using "rerno~al"~
court
where
consolidation can occur.
the jurisdiction of a single
The Proposal also sets out specific procedures for invoking the
two complementary devices-the
antisuit injunction and
preclusion-in recognition of their importance for enhancing
the effects of aggregation. These are not new devices, although
the manner in which the Proposal would use them contains
some innovative features. They are proposed as an integral
part of the ALI consolidation scheme, but they also have
significant applications to other kinds of aggregative
mechanisms not adopted by the Proposal. This article will
examine the application of these devices both as contemplated
by the Proposal in its consolidation scheme and in their current
use in the context of class actions.

The purpose of an antisuit injunction is to prevent
interference with the litigation pending before a court. The
injunction forbids the parties, and possibly other persons over
whom the court has jurisdiction, from litigating outside that
court any claims arising out of the same matters as the suit
before it. The propriety of one court's issuing an injunction to
4. AMERICANLAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEXLITIGATION:
STATUTORY
RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS(1994) [hereinafter COMPLEXLITIGATION
PROPOSAL].
5. Federal-state intersystem consolidation of cases pending in both federal
and state courts would be enhanced by expanding the existing provisions for
removal of state cases to federal court. 28 U.S.C. $5 1441-1452 (1988). Through a
grant of supplemental jurisdiction, state actions arising from the same transaction
a s a pending federal action could be removed to federal court where they could
then be consolidated. COMPLEXLITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 4, $8 5.01-.03.
6. Federal intrasystem consolidation of cases pending in different federal
courts would be enhanced by expanding the scope of the existing "multidistrict
litigation" transfer provision, 28 U.S.C. $ 1407(a) (19881, to include transfer for
trial as well as pretrial disposition. COMPLEXLITIGATIONPROPOSAL, supra note 4,
$9 3.01-.08.
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prevent duplicative litigation in another court has long been
recognized in appropriate cases.7 Injunctions are directed
against the parties who are before the court, rather than
against other ~ o u r t s .The
~
threat of sanctions under the
contempt power serves to enforce the injun~tion.~
Both federal and state courts may issue antisuit
injunctions. Like other injunctions, an antisuit injunction must
satisfy the equitable requirements of irreparable injury and
lack of an adequate remedy at law.'' The general rule,
although susceptible of various exceptions, "is that as a
principle of sound judicial administration, 'the first suit should
have priority, absent the showing of balance of convenience in
favor of the second action.'"" When a federal court enjoins
prosecution of a suit in another federal court, principles of
comity require that courts of coordinate jurisdiction exercise
"forbearance" by "avoiding interference with the process of each
other."12 Injunctions by federal courts against prosecution of
suits in state courts face the additional constraints of the AntiInjunction Act, which forbids injunctions against state
prosecutions subject to three narrow exceptions.13 Injunctions
by state courts against the prosecution of suits in other state

7. See Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., 173 A.2d 225, 228 (N.J.
1961) (stating that to "render complete and final justice, . . . and to protect parties
from the vexation and oppression of litigating the same controversy in different
states," "a court of equity has the power to restrain a party over which it has
personal jurisdiction from prosecuting judicial proceedings in another state"
(citations omitted)); see also Gannon v. Payne, 706 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex. 1986)
("[Sltate courts do have the power to restrain persons from proceeding with suits
filed in other courts of [the] state.").
8. See State ex rel. General Dynamics Corp. v. Luten, 566 S.W.2d 452, 458
(Mo. 1978). But see Honorable Scott 0.Wright & Joseph A. Colussi, The Successful
Use of the Class Action Device in the Management of the Skywalks Mass Tort
Litigation, 52 UMKC L. REV. 141, 148 n.28 (1984) (questioning whether courts can
enjoin other courts from proceeding).
9. See 11A CHARLESA. WRIGHTET AL., FEDERALPRACTICE AND PF~OCEDURE
5 2960 (2d ed. 1995).
10. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971). Cf. DOUGLAS
DEATHOF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE (1992).
LAYCOCK,
11. William Gluckin & Co. v. International Playtex Corp., 407 F.2d 177, 178
(2d Cir. 1969) (quoting Remington Prods. Corp. v. American Aerovap, Inc., 192
F.2d 872, 873 (2d Cir. 1951)).
12. Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 229 (1922) (quoting Cove11 v.
Heyman, 111 U.S. 176, 182 (1884)).
13. 28 U.S.C. 5 2283 (1988) ("A court of the United States may not grant a n
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by
Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgments.").
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courts also face comity barriers since they cross jurisdictional
lines.14 Although state courts may enjoin suits in other state
courts, "[tlhey cannot interfere with the continued prosecution
of pending federal actions nor can they bar commencement of a
federal suit in the future?

A. The ALI Proposal's Antisuit Injunction Provision
The Proposal provides that when actions are transferred
and consolidated,
the transferee court may enjoin transactionally related proceedings, or portions thereof, pending in any state or federal
court whenever it determines that the continuation of those
actions substantially impairs or interferes with the consolidated actions and that an injunction would promote the just,
efficient, and fair resolution of the actions before it.16

The Proposal recognized that even when cases are consolidated, some of the parties may pursue parallel litigation in
other courts. Such a situation arises, for example, when plaintiffs whose actions have been removed and consolidated "file
anew in state court in the hope of outracing the transferee
The antisuit injunction is thus "necescourt to j~dgment."'~
sary to provide for situations in which parties refuse to cooperate and the result is duplicative litigation that interferes with
the transferee court's ability to manage or resolve expeditiously
the claims before it?
The Proposal sets out procedures and standards to be followed by a court in issuing an antisuit injunction. Many provisions are essentially codifications of existing antisuit injunction practice, but there are some distinctive touches that may

14. See James v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 152 N.E.2d 858, 862 (stating that
while an equity court "has power to restrain persons within its jurisdiction from
instituting or proceeding with foreign action, . . . exercise of such power . . . has
been deemed a matter of great delicacy, invoked with great restraint to avoid
distressing conflicts and reciprocal interference with jurisdictionn) cert. denied, 358
U.S. 915 (1958); see also J. E. Macey, Annotation, Injunction by State Court
Against Action in Court of Another State, 6 A.L.R.2d 896 (1949).
15. CHARLESA. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 296 (5th ed. 1994).
However, "[slince the states cannot limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts, they
cannot enjoin proceedings in federal courts, except to protect the jurisdiction of the
state court over property in its custody or under its control." Id.
16. COMPLEX
LITIGATIONPROPOSAL, supra note 4, 5 5.04(a).
17. Id. 5 5.04(a) cmt. a, a t 264.
18. Id.
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affect the use of the device in other contexts such as in class
actions, which will be discussed later in the article.
1. Injunction should be as narrow a s possible
The Comments published with the Proposal caution that
"[tlhe injunction should be as narrow as possible to meet its
objective of protecting the transferee court from undue intrusion."lg The fact that the Proposal allows enjoining of "portions" of actions in other courts enables a court to tailor an
injunction to address the particular actions taken in the other
court that interfere with the pending suit. For example, when
discovery in another court impinges on the ability of the consolidated suit to accomplish orderly and efficient discovery, the
injunction can be tailored to forbid the discovery deemed to
threaten interference, and should remain in force only until
discovery in the consolidated case is completed and the threat
of interference ends.20
2. Transactionally related test
The Proposal restricts application of injunctive power to
"transactionally related proceedings," which is consistent with
current antisuit injunction law. However, the standard can be
devilishly hard to apply in particular cases. The Reporter's
Notes say that "[alntisuit injunctions should be used against
those cases that are truly duplicative, and not those only tangentially related."21 The example given is the classic interpleader case, State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. T a ~ h i r ein
,~~
which the Court limited the availability of injunctions to actions involving the interpleader fund itself, and not to actions
that simply related t o the fund in some way. Tashire, however,
did not attempt to elucidate the boundaries of the relationship
test. The Proposal's transactionally related test is similarly
general.
Difficult questions arise when parallel suits involve some
parties and claims that are different from the aggregated suit.
For example, a parallel suit may leave out some previously
named parties, add some previously unnamed parties, or assert

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 265.
Id. at 264-65.
Id. 8 5.04 cmt. d, n.11, at 274.
386 US. 523, 533-37 (1967).
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some different claims. A clever party seeking to avoid the constraints of consolidation may purposely shape a parallel case to
contain such differences. In the situation where there has been
a decision to remove or transfer and then consolidate such
parallel cases,23there would already have been a determination of a relationship between the cases that should normally
satisfy the transactionally related test for an antisuit injunction. But when an antisuit injunction is sought against prosecuting a case that has not yet been consolidated, on the ground
that it immediately interferes with disposition of the consolidated action, the transactionally related test will have to be
independently satisfied.
3. Factors to be considered
The ALI Proposal sets out four factors to be considered in
. ~ ~ are referred to as "disgranting an antisuit i n j u n ~ t i o nThey
cretionary" in the comment^,^' suggesting a balancing approach. These factors share some similarities with the three
exceptions in the Anti-Injunction
but the legislation
contemplated by the Proposal is intended to function as an
additional, express exception to the Act. The Comments state
that the proposed statute accords "express injunctive power" to
the transferee court "to avoid the possibility of restrictions
imposed by the Anti-Injunction Act."27Indeed, the Comments
assert a strong federal court interest, overriding the deference
to state interests in the Anti-Injunction Act, that warrants such
exception:
As with interpleader, no one state may have the power to
effect a solution that will reach across state boundaries; a
national solution requires the assertion of federal power.
Thus, in addition to the federal judicial system's interest in
conserving its own resources, the federal government has an

23. COMPLEX LITIGATION
PROPOSAL, supra note 4, 5 3.01 (providing for transfer and consolidation of actions commenced in different federal district courts); id.
5 5.01 (providing for removal to and consolidation in federal court of civil actions
pending in one or more state courts).
24. COMPLEX LITIGATION
PROPOSAL, supra note 4, § 5.04(b).
25. Id. 5 5.04 cmt. d, at 271.
26. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
27. COMPLEX LITIGATION
PROPOSAL, supra note 4, 5 5.04 cmt. b, at 267. Although a statutory exception need not expressly mention injunctions, see Mitchum
v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), the drafters felt explicit authority would avoid uncertainty.
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interest, if not an obligation, to provide a procedure to remedy
this interstate problem. This interest necessarily may overcome the interests of an individual state in providing a forum
for its litigants in appropriate circumstances, particularly
when the allowance of the state action prevents the federal
court from effectuating its legitimate federal objective^.^'

a. How far the individual actions have progressed. The
factors to be considered in granting an antisuit injunction are
reflective of existing practice, with some useful clarifications.
The f i r s t " h o w far the actions to be enjoined have progre~sed"~~-goesto concerns of both comity and efficiency.
Nothing is more disruptive of existing expectations than issuance of an antisuit injunction by the judge in a newly aggregated case that prevents further proceedings in cases that have
long been on the docket and are ready to go to trial. Take, for
example, an injunctive dispute between two federal district
The U.S. Discourts involving the school asbestos litigati~n.~'
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania certified a
mandatory nationwide class of schools against three major
asbestos producers for costs incurred in removing asbestos. In
the certification order, the court enjoined class members from
filing new suits, or from prosecuting pending suits, against the
defendants .31
At that time, two suits by Texas school districts had been
pending for three years in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas and were set for trial in three months.32
Upon learning of the Pennsylvania court's injunction, the plaintiffs obtained an injunction from the Texas court enjoining both
plaintiffs and defendants from prosecuting or defending the
cases "in any other court" and enjoining "all proceedings in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania which entail in any manner the controversy in the
28. COMPLEXLI~GATION
PROPOSAL,supra note 4, 8 5.04 cmt. c, a t 270.
29. Id. 4 5.04(b)(l).
30. The dispute is described in more detail in Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions and Duplicative Litigation, 62 IND. L.J. 507, 519-22 (1987).
31. In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., unpublished order (April 13, 1984) (by Judge
James Kelly), described in In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422, 426 (E.D. Pa.
1984), opinion amended, 107 F.R.D. 215 (1985), and affd in part, rev'd in part, 789
F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), and cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (U.S.).
32. See Dayton Indep. Sch. Dist. v. United States Gypsum Co., Civ. Ac. No.
B-81-277-CA (E.D. Tex., filed Apr. 22, 1981); Evadale Indep. Sch. Dist. v. United
States Gypsum Co., Civ. Ac. No. B-81-293-CA (E.D. Tex., filed Apr. 27, 1981) (consolidated Mar. 22, 1983).
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above styled and numbered cause."33The order noted that the
cases before the Texas court were first in time, but expressed
reluctance "to determine choice of forum by rigid mechanical
application of a general rule."34 It relied instead on "practical
and equitable realities" including the considerable investment
of time and effort in holding pretrial conferences and hearings,
the trial settings, and the fact that subsuming these two cases
under the class action "would cause prodigious delay and
A month later, the Pennsylvania court modithwart j~stice."~
fied its injunction to exclude existing suits.36
Clearly, the two Texas cases should not have been subjected to the antisuit injunction. They had progressed too far to
justify requiring them to join an aggregated case that might be
years away from settlement or trial. However, antisuit injunctions are often issued as a prophylactic measure against pending and future litigation without judicial consideration of all
the individual pending cases. The class in the asbestos school
litigation was estimated a t 8,500 schools, and the Pennsylvania
court was probably unaware of the particular circumstances of
the Texas cases, or indeed, of other pending cases.
If, as the ALI Proposal contemplates, antisuit injunctions
may be a normal complement to consolidation, careful scrutiny
of the status of pending cases is necessary. A court should
require parties moving for an injunction to report on the status
of all known pending cases and should assess whether allowing
them to go forward would really interfere with the proper disposition of the consolidated action. If time is truly of the essence-for example, if there is reason to believe that irreparable actions will be taken in pending cases if an injunction
does not issue immediately-a court might be required to issue
an injunction and to allow parties whose cases are enjoined to
petition within a reasonable time for exclusion from the injunction.
There is another aspect of mass duplicative litigation that
may, however, undermine the rationale for not enjoining the
pending Texas cases. Aggregation of all similar cases through
33. Dayton Indep. Sch. Dist., unpublished order of June 28, 1984 (by Judge
Robert M. Parker), at 7.
34. Id. at 3.
35. Id. at 4-5.
36. In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 594 F. Supp. 178, 179 (E.D. Pa. 1984). The
certification of a mandatory class was ultimately reversed on appeal. In re Asbestos
Sch. Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 998-99 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U S . 852, 915 (1986).
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consolidation or class action can provide a window of opportunity for settlement that would not exist if the cases were individually litigated. Defendants may be willing to make a global
settlement of all claims against them only if they can be assured that the settlement will resolve their total liability.37In
addition, if individual cases are allowed to be tried outside the
aggregated action, substantial funds to pay damages may be
siphoned off. If the defendants are shaky financially, releasing
individual cases from aggregate treatment could result in bankruptcy. Such circumstances may be grounds for certifying a
mandatory class action in which the plaintiffs may not opt
In consolidated cases of the type contemplated by the
Proposal, the antisuit injunction may serve as a sort of surrogate for a mandatory class action by prohibiting individual
litigation that would disrupt the resolution of the aggregated
case.
Releasing the pending Texas cases from the injunction was
not likely to interfere with the resolution of the school asbestos
litigation. However, if a large number of such cases went forward outside the class action, the possibility of settling the
class litigation might have been imperiled. The ALI Proposal
does not address these kinds of considerations relating to the
propriety of antisuit injunctions, perhaps in the belief that they
are germane only to class actions. Yet consolidation is in many
ways the functional equivalent of a class action, and the role of
the antisuit injunction in holding together an aggregated case
to enhance settlement should not be ignored.
b. Degree of duplication. The second factor to be considered in granting an antisuit injunction under the Proposal is
the degree to which the actions pending in other courts are
duplicative of the consolidated proceeding^.^^ This factor
serves both economy/efficiency and inconsistent outcome con-

37. See infia part I.B.3.b.
38. See I n re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 789-90
(E.D.N.Y. 1980) (finding a mandatory Rule 23(b)(l)(B) class action appropriate if
there is a substantial probability that the limited h n d represented by defendants'
assets would be exceeded), reh'g denied in part, 534 FSupp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982),
and modified in part, 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), and mandamus denied, 725
F.2d 858 (2d Cir.), and cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984). But see In re Northern
Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 851 (9th Cir.
1982) (barring Rule 23(b)(l)(B) certification "unless separate actions 'inescapably
will alter the substance of the rights of others having similar claims'" (citations
omitted)), cert. denied, 459 US. 1171 (1983)).
39. COMPLEXLITIGATIONPROPOSAL, supra note 4, 5 5.04(b)(2).
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cerns, and therefore overlaps with the threshold question as to
whether the cases are transactionally related. The Comments
warn that "[blecause issues vary in significance, this inquiry
into the level of duplication cannot be reduced to some formula. ~ ~ the savic determination of minimum ~ o m m o n a l i t y Thus,
ings resulting from unitary adjudication of a single, vital issue
might warrant an injunction, while the existence of a number
of common issues of lesser importance might not justify prohibiting individual adjudications. The focus would seem to be on
whether the individual cases are closely enough related to the
consolidated case that there would be a significant repetition of
evidence and witne~ses.~'
c. Whether there are issues of federal law. The third
factor in determining the propriety of an antisuit injunction
focuses directly on federalism concerns-whether the actions to
be enjoined involve issues or claims of federal law.42 If state
suits involve predominantly state issues, comity and abstention
may dictate against an injunction. The Comments call on the
judge to "weigh the benefits of aggregation against the potenThe greater the signifitial intrusion on state sovereignty.yy43
cance of federal issues, the less likely it is that an injunction
would intrude on legitimate state interests. But if cases are
dominated by state issues, "enjoining their prosecution in a
state court should require a strong finding that the benefits of
consolidation in the transferee court [otherwise] would be under~nined."~~
Such a finding might be justified if the state
action were parallel or if the plaintiffs had filed the action after
the order to transfer and consolidate "in an effort to engage in
a race to judgment or to avoid the governing law chosen under
the applicable federal choice of law standard^."^
d. Interests of nonparties. The last factor in the decision
whether to issue an antisuit injunction relates to the interests
of persons whose cases were not consolidated. Normally,
nonparties to the consolidated litigation would not be subject to
an injunction. However, the ALI Proposal contemplates the
possibility that nonparties will be enjoined so long as the con-

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. § 5.04 cmt. d, a t 272.
Id.
Id. 5.04(b)(3).
Id. 5.04 cmt. d, a t 273.
Id.
Id.
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solidating court has personal jurisdiction over them. The jurisdictional requirement can easily be met because the Proposal
would expand the jurisdictional power of the transferee court to
assert jurisdiction wherever the nonparties may be located.46
In support of this expansion, the Reporter's Notes cite the interpleader statute that affords similar nationwide jurisdiction
to federal courts and empowers them to enjoin all suits brought
by adverse claimants to a fund, obligation, or re^.^?
Exclusion of a case from consolidation would reflect an
initial determination that individual litigation would not endanger the aggregated proceeding. However, the aggregation
decision may sometimes be neither as comprehensive nor as
far-sighted as it should be. In addition, matters may arise later
concerning nonparty litigation that would undermine the effective disposition of the consolidated case. For example, discovery
undertaken in an individual suit may interfere directly with
discovery management in the consolidated litigation. The
Reporter's Notes indicate that in such a case, "an injunction
prohibiting certain discovery for a short time until the parties
in the consolidated suit have completed it might be appropriate."48

B. Antisuit Injunction Practice in Class Actions
The provision for antisuit injunctions in the ALI Proposal
is focused on the transfer-removal-consolidation scheme that
the Proposal has adopted. However, the greatest need for
antisuit injunctions in mass duplicative litigation today is probably in class actions. Although the Proposal does not address
class actions, its rationale for the use of antisuit injunctions
and its procedures and standards for their issuance are relevant to class actions. The class-action context poses additional
and sometimes different issues with which the federal courts
have wrestled during the past several years.

1. Traditional Anti-Injunction Act constraints
The expansion of the antisuit injunction in the class-action
context has been the product of necessity, particularly arising
from mass duplicative litigation in federal courts in which the

46. Id. 4 5.04 cmt. b, n.7, at 268-69.
47. Id. at 269 (citing 28 U.S.C.$ 2361 (1988)).
48. Id. 4 5.04 cmt. d, at 273.
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risk of interference by state-court suits is particularly vexing.
Constraints on antisuit injunctions in class actions arise fkom
the Anti-Injunction Act, principles of federalism, and limitations on the equitable injunctive power.
The Anti-Injunction Act imposes the most serious constraint on the use of antisuit injunctions by class-action courts.
There is no express "class-action" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act in Rule 23." This contrasts with statutory interpleader which provides that a district court may restrain all claimants "fkom instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in any
State or United States court affecting the property, instrument
or obligation involved in the interpleader action."50 The ALI
Proposal's provision of an express exception to the Anti-Injunction Act for antisuit injunctions under its consolidation scheme
might also serve as a model for an exception for class act i o n ~ In
. ~ the
~ absence of an exception, however, antisuit injunctions in class actions have had to be shoe-horned into one
of the three exceptions in the Act.

49. I t might be argued that Rule 23(d), which allows a court to "make appropriate orders" to determine the course of proceedings, should be construed as an
express exception. See Steven M. Larimore, Exploring the Interface Between Rule 23
Class Actions and the Anti-Injunction Act, 18 GA. L. REV. 259, 274-84 (1984);
Sherman, supra note 30, a t 528-33. This position has not been accepted by the
courts. See In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 335 (2d Cir. 1985); Piambino
v. Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1980). "This is probably the correct result, because Rule 83 commands that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not to
affect basic jurisdictional statutes, and the 'jurisdiction' to be protected in these
class actions is actually made possible by Rule 23 itself." Diane P. Wood, FineTuning Judicial Federalism: A Proposal for Reform of the Anti-Injunction Act, 1990
B.Y.U. L. REV. 289, 315.
50. 28 U.S.C. 9 2361 (1988). However, a court may only exercise this authority when a deposit has been made or a bond provided by the stakeholder as required by the statute. Austin v. Texas-Ohio Gas Co., 218 F.2d 739, 745 (5th Cir.
1955).
51. Professor (now Judge) Wood proposed amending 28 U.S.C. 5 2283 to add
an exception that would allow antisuit injunctions "when necessary to ensure the
effectiveness of a class action certified under federal statutes or rules, or
multidistrict litigation ordered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 9 1407, or court-ordered arbitration, or in aid of a claim for interpleader." Wood, supra note 49, a t 320. The
standard for this exception ("when n e c e s s w to ensure the effectiveness of a [certified] class actionn) is vague, as is the standard in the ALI Proposal ("whenever
[the court] determines that the continuation of those actions substantially impairs
or interferes with the consolidated actionsn). The federalism concerns expressed in
the Anti-Injunction Act might be better served by a narrower exception. One might
attempt, for example, to tailor an exception to those precise situations in which
duplicative state-court suits truly interfere with the effectiveness of a federalcourt
aggregated case and in which the federal interest should clearly be given prominence. Drafting such a rule, however, would not be an easy task.

DUPLICATIVE LITIGATION
The second exception-"necessary in aid of its jurisdiction"-holds the most promise for avoiding the Act in mass
duplicative litigation. It might seem to apply if duplicative
suits by class members would disrupt a class action by siphoning off class members. However, this exception "has often been
construed with the greatest nineteenth century rigor the courts
can muster."52The Supreme Court's 1922 decision in Kline v.
Burke Construction Co. distinguished between in rem and in
personam actions, finding that historical equity practice would
only permit enjoining of duplicative litigation when necessary
to prevent interference with a court's jurisdiction over a re^.^^
Duplicative in personam actions, in contrast, had to be allowed
to proceed concurrently, and "an injunction could not issue to
restrain a state action in personam involving the same subject
matter from going on at the same time."" Although school
desegregation cases were analogized to in rern actions to justify
enjoining state suits that would undermine the remedy and
effective compliance by the parties,55 the Supreme Court stated with assurance in 1977 that it had "never viewed parallel in
personam actions as interfering with" a court's j u r i s d i ~ t i o n . ~ ~
The limitations that this view imposes on the ability of a
federal court to prevent interference with a pending class action can be seen in the In re Federal Skywalk Cases." There,
the district court certified a mandatory class of all persons with
claims arising out of the collapse of skywalks in the Hyatt
Regency Hotel in Kansas City in 1981.The court also issued an
antisuit injunction preventing class members from settling
their punitive damage claims in existing suits until the classaction trial was concluded. The court reasoned that the first
litigants to obtain punitive damages might exhaust the fund of
available resources or might curtail the ability of other litigants
to receive punitive-damage awards.58 The Eighth Circuit
found that the mandatory class certification constituted an
injunction that violated the Anti-Injunction Act, rejecting anal-

52. Wood, supra note 49, at 301.
53. 260 U.S. 226, 229-32 (1922).
54. Sherman, supra note 30, at 532 (quoting 3B J. MOORE& J. KENNEDY,
MOORE'S FEDERALPRACTICE 'j[ 23.92, at 23-570 (2d ed., 1985)).
55. WRIGHT,supra note 15, at 303 n.50.
56. Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 642 (1977).
57. 93 F.R.D.415, 424-25 (W.D. Mo.), vacated, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), and
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982).
58. Skywalk, 93 F.R.D. at 425-28.
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ogies to federal interpleader jurisdiction and finding that the
risk of exhausting the resources of a defendant by individual
punitive damages did not warrant invoking the "in aid of its
jurisdiction" exception.5g
2. A modest expansion of antisuit injunctive powers
In the last decade, there has been a modest expansion of
federal courts' antisuit injunctive powers through application
and interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act and the All Writs
Act?' Two situations have emerged in which courts have allowed resort to antisuit injunctions to prevent class members
from litigating their suits individually.
The first occurs when cases that were consolidated in a
federal court under Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) proceedings6l have progressed to the stage of imminent settlement.
For example, in In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigat i ~ n , ~the
' district court certified as a mandatory class action
fifty-two private antitrust suits previously consolidated under
MDL. The Fifth Circuit upheld the mandatory class action and
the court's injunction which prevented the class members from
filing suit in state courts. The circuit court invoked both the "in
aid of its jurisdiction" and "to protect or effectuate its judgments" exceptions of the Anti-Injunction
stressing that
the district court had approved the settlements with most of
the defendants at the time it issued the injunction.
In re Baldwin-United Corp.64 further extended the doctrine that an antisuit injunction was justified to protect irnminent settlement of consolidated cases. In In re Baldwin, over
one hundred federal securities suits by 100,000 holders of annuities issued by the now bankrupt Baldwin-United had been

59. Skywalk, 680 F.2d at 1182-84. There is a similarity between the requirement for a mandatory "limited fundn class action under Rule 23(b)(l)(B) (see infra
note 70 for requirements of a "limited fundn) and for the' "in aid of its jurisdictionn
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. Both can be seen as requiring an essentially
in rem action. However, it would be a mistake to conclude that only mandatory
class actions can satisfy that exception under the Anti-Injunction Act. Courts have
upheld antisuit injunctions even in Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class actions. See In re
Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1985).
60. 28 U.S.C. 5 1651(a) (1988).
61. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
62. 80 F.R.D.244 (S.D. Tex. 1978), afd, 659 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct.
1981).
63. Corrugated Containers, 659 F.2d a t 1334-35.
64. 770 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1985).
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consolidated under MDL. After two years of negotiations and
with the parties nearing settlement, the federal district court
approved a nationwide opt-out class action on behalf of all
holders of the annuities for the purpose of settlement. When
certain state attorneys general threatened to sue in state
courts on behalf of resident class members who were opposed to
the settlements, the court enjoined such suits. The Second
Circuit upheld the injunction under the "in aid of its jurisdiction" exception, finding the imminent settlement to be "the
virtual equivalent of a re^."^^ It found the settlement was
close to finalization and that "the potential for an onslaught of
state actions . . . threatened to 'seriously impair the federal
court's flexibility and authority' to approve settlements in the
multi-district l i t i g a t i ~ n . " ~ ~
A similar approach was taken in the mass torts case of In
re Asbestos School L i t i g ~ t i o n .There,
~~
the Third Circuit upheld an antisuit injunction against prosecuting suits outside
the class action, pending the district court's ruling on a proposed settlement. "[Tlhis court's ability to oversee a possible
settlement," it said, "would be 'seriously impaired' by the continuing litigation of parallel actions?
The second situation warranting the issuance of an
antisuit injunction arises out of class actions related to bankruptcy. The bankruptcy of Johns-Manville led to a settlement
and the creation of a trust for the benefit of asbestos vict i m ~ When
. ~ ~ unexpectedly large claims and transaction costs
threatened the viability of the trust, Judge Jack Weinstein,
who had continuing jurisdiction due to the bankruptcy, certified
a mandatory 'limited fund" class of claimants to the trust to
facilitate a settlement that would revise the trust arrangement.?' He also issued a nationwide injunction against prose-

65. Id. a t 337.
66. Id. a t 337 (citations omitted).
67. No. 83-0268, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5142 (E.D. Pa. April 16, 1991), aff'd
mem., 950 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1991).
68. Id. a t *6.
69. In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.),
120 B.R. 648, 653 (E. & S.D.N.Y.1990).
70. Id. A "limited fund" class is the paradigm of a Rule 23(b)(l)(B) class
action in which individual adjudications would as a practical matter impair the
ability of the putative class members to protect their interests. A "limited fund"
exists "where the claims of all plaintiffs exceed[] the assets of the defendant and
hence to allow any group of individuals to be fully compensated would impair the
rights of those not in court." Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335,
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cution of any claims against the trust,?' relying on the
"imminency of settlement" rationaleT2to invoke the "in aid of
its jurisdiction" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act:
The courts are in the process of reviewing the stipulation of
settlement of the proposed class action encompassing the
claims of all beneficiaries of the Trust. At this critical juncture, the courts must be able to continue-confident that the
assets available to settle the case will remain intact. An injunction of all proceedings is necessary to implement the
terms of the settlement and to protect the courts' jurisdiction
over the class action.73

Judge Weinstein also invoked the All Writs Act,74"[wlhether
viewed as an affirmative grant of power to the courts or an
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act," as authority for courts "to
certify a national class action and to stay pending federal and
state cases brought on behalf of class members."75

3. Injunctive developments in global class-action settlements
The extension of class-action treatment to mass tortsT6

1340 n.9 (9th Cir. 1976).
71. In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 120 B.R. a t 653-54. A mandatory class action was also certified for claimants against Eagle-Picher, a major manufacturer of asbestos which was in severe financial difficulty, and all actions against
i t were similarly enjoined nationwide. In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. (In
re Eagle-Picher Indus.), 134 F.R.D. 32 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1990).
72. See In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1985); Standard
Microsystems Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc., 916 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that a stay of proceedings in state court is appropriate under the "in aid of its
jurisdiction" exception "where a federal court is on the verge of settling a complex
matter, and state court proceedings may undermine its ability to achieve that objective"). Noting the analogy drawn between class-action litigation and in rem actions in Baldwin-United, Judge Weinstein found the analogy even stronger in the
Manville litigation "since the Trust constitute[dl a res that ha[dl been created in a
bankruptcy proceeding to compensate all injuries resulting from Manville asbestoscontaining products." In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 120 B.R. a t 657.
73. In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 120 B.R. a t 656.
74. 28 U.S.C. 8 1651(a) (1988). The All Writs Act reads: "The Supreme Court
and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and
principles of law." Id.
75. In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 120 B.R. a t 656.
76. The 1966 Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 23 state: "A 'mass accident'
resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class
action because of the likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but
of liability and defenses to liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in
different ways." 39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966). 'While the initial trend appeared to
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has led to a number of global settlements aimed a t buying
peace for the defendants against all present (and in some cases
future) claimants. Three prominent global class-action settlements have been approved by federal courts in the last two
years,77and in all three cases, antisuit injunctions were a critical, bargained-for feature. The injunctive issues involved complicated questions of jurisdiction, due process, opt-out rights,
and judicial authority under the Anti-Injunction Act and All
Writs Act.
a. Georgine: Fending o f fduplicative suits from every quarter. The first of the global class actions, Georgine v. Amchem
a settlement with a consortium of twenty
P r o d u ~ t sinvolved
,~~
asbestos manufacturers. As has become the practice in a number of mass-tort settlements, motions for stipulation of settlement and for certification of a settlement class were filed simultaneously.7g These motions sought certification of a
nonmandatory Rule 23(b)(3) class, with opt-out rights, defined
as all persons in the U.S. who had been exposed occupationally
or derivatively in the household to defendants' asbestos products, and who had not yet filed suit, as to all claims of injury
whether or not disease had been manifested." The defendants
were obviously seeking and, in fact, obtained as a condition for
paying the $1.2 billion settlement that all claims present and
future would be extinguished by the class-action judgment. The
stipulation of settlement likewise provided that once the court
approved the settlement, all class members would be enjoined
from instituting or maintaining any claim or action for asbestos-related injuries against a defendant.81
Within two weeks after the stipulation of settlement and
class certification motions were filed, the district court provi-

preclude the use of class actions in mass torts, the overwhelming burden of these
cases in the twenty years since the Advisory Notes were published has revived
efforts to utilize the device to fashion equitable and efficient remedies." In re Joint
E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 807 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated,
982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), and modified on reh'g, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993).
77. For a criticism of the three global class-action settlements which are discussed in this article, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the
Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM.L. REV. 1343 (1995).
78. 878 F. Supp. 716 (E.D.Pa. 1994). The litigation that has come to be
known as Georgine was originally titled Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 834 F.
Supp. 1437 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
79. See Carlough v. Amchem Prods., 10 F.3d 189, 193 (3d Cir. 1993).
80. Id. at 194-95.
81. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 878 F. Supp. a t 721-22.
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sionally approved the class action, but there was considerable
opposition to the settlement by putative class members. Two
months after filing, and before the court had established a
period for opt-out, some absent class members filed a classaction complaint in a West Virginia court seeking to represent
class members who had been exposed in West Virginia." They
sought a declaratory judgment that the proposed global settlement in federal court was not binding on the class members
because of lack of jurisdiction and other defects.83In response,
the defendants obtained from the federal court a preliminary
injunction forbidding the West Virginia class members from
prosecuting their suit or from pursuing "duplicative litigation"
in any other forum."
On appeal of the injunction, the Third Circuit held that the
district court lacked power to enjoin parallel litigation when
the absent class members, at the time the injunction was issued, had not been given the opportunity to opt
Applying the Supreme Court's decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
S h ~ t t sthe
, ~ ~court found that absent class members can only
be bound by a class-action damages judgment,87 in the absence of minimum contacts, if they are provided timely notice
and an opportunity to opt out. By the time the appeal was
decided, however, the district court had established an opt-out
period and the class members still had an opportunity to optout. The circuit court found that the opportunity of the class
members to opt out remedied the Shutts problem.88The cir82. See Carlough, 10 F.3d a t 195-96 (describing Gore v. Amchem Prods., No.
93-C-195 (Cir. Ct. of Monogalia County, W. Va.)).
83. Carlough, 10 F.3d at 195. See infra note 98 for the argument against
jurisdiction.
84. Carlough, 10 F.3d at 196.
85. Id. at 200.
86. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
87. The Court in Shutts limited its holding to "those class actions which seek
to bind known plaintiffs concerning claims wholly or predominately for money judgments" and expressed "no view concerning other types of class actions, such as
those seeking equitable relief." Id. a t 811-12 n.3. A prominently held view is that
in Rule 23(b)(l) and (2) class actions, a court can assert jurisdiction over absent
plaintiff class members who lack minimum contacts with the forum even though
there is no opt-out right. See Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and
Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 96
YALEL.J. 1, 54 (1986). But see Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 392
(9th Cir. 19921, cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 1359 (1994) (finding that class members
in a Rule 23(b)(l) and (2) class action were denied due process by not being allowed to opt out).
88. Carlough, 10 F.3d at 199-201.
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cuit court went on to approve the antisuit injunction as necessary to protect the court's jurisdiction to accomplish the proposed settlement?' It found authority in the Anti-Injunction
Act and All Writs Act, endorsing the approach taken in the Asbestos School Litigation and Baldwin-United that the
imminency of a class-action settlement warranted an injunction
"in aid of its jurisdi~tion."'~
One might ask what was accomplished by enjoining the
West Virginia class action when the persons who brought that
suit, as well as other putative class members, could still opt out
of the global class action. The answer lies in the fact that the
West Virginia suit sought much more than just the right of
individual class members to opt out. It sought to prevent both a
global settlement that would include future claimants and a
nationwide class action by carving out a state class action."
The right to opt out need not be fatal to a global settlement if,
as actually did occur here, the bulk of the class members
choose not to opt out. But the West Virginia suit sought to
undermine the viability of the class-action structure and settlement, thereby satisfying the rigorous standard of the "in aid of
its jurisdiction" exception that an injunction must be necessary
"'to prevent a state court from so interfering with a federal
court's consideration or disposition of a case as to seriously
impair the federal court's flexibility and authority to decide
that case."'92 Enjoining the West Virginia action thus helped
to presewe the global character of the federal class and the
attendant efficacy of the settlement.

89. Id. at 203. The Third Circuit cited, inter alia, In re Corrugated Container
Antitrust Litig., 659 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
936 (1982); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1985); In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 1991 WL 61156 (E.D. Pa. April 16, 1991), aff'd men., 950 F.2d 723
(3d Cir. 1991); Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 877, 881 (11th Cir.
1989) (stating that a parallel state suit may be enjoined under the "necessary in
aid of its jurisdiction" exception); James v. Bellotti, 733 F.2d 989, 993-94 (1st Cir.
1984) (finding an injunction against state-court suits justified by a provisionally
approved settlement).
90. Carlough, 10 F.3d at 201-03.
91. "[Tlhe stated purpose of the Gore suit is to challenge the propriety of the
federal class action, which the district court characterized as a preemptive strike
against the viability of the federal suit, and to obtain rulings from the West Virginia state court regarding the West Virginia class members' right to opt out of
the federal action." Id. a t 203.
92. In re Glenn W. Turner Enters. Litig., 521 F.2d 775, 780 (3d Cir. 1975)
(quoting Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S.
281, 295 (1970)).
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Despite success in thwarting the West Virginia suit, the
global settlement in Georgine faced further threats of
duplicative litigation. Within the first half-year after the optout period ended, some 2,500 individual suits were filed in
courts around the country by class members who had not timely filed their opt out.93The defendants, rather than seeking to
enforce the antisuit provision of the settlement agreement:4
sought a class-wide injunction forbidding class members from
initiating or prosecuting asbestos-related claims in duplicative
proceedings. The court granted the injunction, finding that the
existence of 2,500 suits "demonstrates a strong likelihood that
these state court proceedings would seriously impair this
Court's authority to preside over the Georgine ~ e t t l e m e n t . " ~ ~
According to the court such suits would force the defendants "to
defend the settled claims of class members in multiple jurisdictions," would "undercut the financial planning and claims procedures provided in the Stipulation," and would "jeopardize the
security of the existence of a fund to compensate class members
for their inj~ries."'~
The final chapter in the Georgine attempt to curb
duplicative litigation was written when Casimir Ballonis filed
suit in a Maryland state court ten months after the opt-out
period ended.g7Mr. Ballonis alleged that he had only recently
been diagnosed as having mesothelioma (a probably fatal cancer) resulting from exposure to the defendants' asbestos. He
had not opted out of the class, being unaware of his asbestosrelated disease. Mr. Ballonis' claim was precisely the type of
claim that had concerned those who had opposed inclusion of
potential claimants in the Georgine class.98 The defendants
93. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 878 F. Supp. 716, 721 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
94. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 81.
95. Id. at 722.
96. Id.
97. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 1995 WL 422792, at *3 (E.D. Pa. April 1,
1995).
98. These opponents argued that "the 'exposure only' plaintiffs lacked standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court to decide their claims based on
mere exposure to asbestos." Initial Brief of Appellants on Appeal from Preliminary
Injunction at 36, Georgine v. Amchem Prods., (3d Cir. 1995) (filed Feb. 6, 1995)
(No. 941925). Because exposure only plaintiffs had sustained "no physical harm as
a result of their exposure, [they] sought relief only for their increased risk of developing asbestos-related disease, their fear of contracting such a disease, and their
need for medical surveillance to allow the early detection of an asbestos-related illness," demonstrating that these plaintiffs lacked a judicially cognizable claim or
injury. Id. Second, the opponents of including future claimants noted that
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moved to hold Mr. Ballonis and his lawyer in contempt for
prosecuting his suit in violation of the court's antisuit injunction. Citing its prior findings that the notice to the class by
publication was adequate and the settlement was fair," the
court rejected Mr. Ballonis' argument that it should lift the
injunction because it was unfair to him (he would have to settle
his case within the $37,000 to $60,000 range in the settlement
schedule while verdicts in mesothelioma cases generally exceed
a million dollars).'00 Instead, the court granted the
defendants' motion, holding Mr. Ballonis and his attorney in
contempt for pursuing the Maryland suit by seeking discovery
and ordering them to cease all prosec~tion.'~'
The Ballonis holding is a logical extension of the use of
antisuit injunctions in the global settlement of "futures" class
actions. If defendants are really to be accorded peace by global
settlements, even apparent injustice to a class member who
may not have had actual notice of the right to opt out and who
was unaware that he had a present medical condition is to be
countenanced. It was the "futures" class that particularly dictated this harsh result in Georgine; members of a "futures''
class who have not manifested an injury are less likely to get
actual notice because they may not realize that a published
notice applies to them. However, even without a "futures" class,
the antisuit injunction can be Draconian. "Present'' class members who have manifested disease may also not see the published notice and may miss their opportunity to opt out. Once
an antisuit injunction is issued, judges tend to admit few exceptions. If the injunction were lifted for Mr. Ballonis, "it arguably would have to be lifted for countless other plaintiffs who
are similarly situated or who claim that they would be better

The gross unfairness of allowing named plaintiffs to bargain away the
rights of absent class members with respect to claims which are outside
the scope of their capacity as class representatives is particularly severe
when the claims being released do not even yet exist. . . . If the 'exposure only' class representatives wish to trade their own unaccrued, potential asbestos claims for the terms of the proposed settlement, that is their
business and their choice. But the district court cannot mandate that all
persons who have ever been exposed to the CCR members' asbestos-containing products must also give up their unaccrued, potential future
rights.
Id. at 68.
99. Georgine, 1995 WL 422792 at *4.
100. Id.
101. Id. at "10.
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off litigating their individual claims," which "would lead to the
disintegration of the Georgine settlement with substantial
prejudice to the . . . defendants and the class generally."lo2
b. Breast Implant Litigation: Trying to hold the class together for settlement possibilities. The second global class action
in which antisuit injunctions have been invoked is the In re
Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation .Io3
In this litigation, pending federal court cases against the manufacturers of breast implants were consolidated under MDL in
the federal court in the northern District of Alabama.lo4 A
global class-action settlement was preliminarily approved by
Judge Sam Pointer for all claims, present and future, arising
from a breast implant manufactured by the settling defendants.lo5 Judge Pointer ordered notice by publication and
established an opt-out period during which putative class members were enjoined from going to trial in any other court.'06
Upon approving the settlement after the opt-out period expired,
Judge Pointer enjoined class members f?om instituting or prosecuting any claims against the settling defendants.'" The
viability of the Breast Implant Litigation settlement was subsequently undermined by an unexpectedly large number of claimants,lo8 but the antisuit injunction remained in effect while
negotiations and maneuvering continued.
Unlike Georgine, there was no substantial direct disobedience of the antisuit injunction by class members. The antisuit
injunction played a less significant role than in Georgine, and
the opt-out class action was not as all-inclusive (due in part to
the inability to remove and consolidate with the MDL action
many state-court cases as to which there was no diversity jurisdiction).logHowever, despite the demise of the original global

102. Id. at *11.
103. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098
(J.P.M.L. 1992).
104. Id. at 1101.
105. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 1994 WL 114580
(N.D. Ala. April 1, 1995).
106. Id. at *6-*8. There was also to be a unique, second opt-out period after
an evaluation of available resources following receipt of claims.
107. Id. at *7.
108. See S. Gale Dick, Can Implant Settlement Be Saved? 13 ALTERNATIVES
TO
THE HIGH COSTOF LITIG. 109 (1995); Barry Meier, Judge Discloses New Details on
Settlement of Implant Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1995, a t A10.
109. See Joseph Nocera, Fatal Litigation, FORTUNE,Oct. 16, 1995, a t 60; Joseph Nocera, Fatal Litigation: Part 11, FORTUNE,Oct. 30, 1995, a t 137.
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settlement, the antisuit injunction helped to hold the federal
settlement class action together while alternatives were explored.
c. Ahearn: Buttressing a mandatory class action. The
third recent global class action in which antisuit injunctions
have been used is Ahearn v. Fibreboard Gorp.'" Ahearn illustrates a different approach to the prevention of duplicative
litigation. A settlement as to both present and future claims
was reached between the defendant Fibreboard and the attorneys representing a class of all persons exposed to Fibreboard's
asbestos products. As in Georgine, the motion to certify a class
action was filed simultaneously with the proposed settlement
agreement. Shortly thereafter, the district court judge, Robert
M. Parker, provisionally certified the class and issued an expansive antisuit injunction."' He enjoined all class members
from initiating any personal injury claims against Fibreboard
in any court, "whether by way of commencing litigation, intervening in existing litigation to which Fibreboard is a party,
joining Fibreboard in any existing litigation, or in any other
manner asserting any such claim . . . not pending before the effective time of [the] temporary restraining order."l12
In contrast to the classes in Georgine and the Breast Implant Litigation, the class in Ahearn was certified as a mandatory class under Rule 23(b)(l)(B) without opt-out rights.'13
Certification of a mandatory class was ordered because a sizable part of the funds to be paid under the multibillion dollar
settlement came from insurance companies whose liability was
uncertain because of pending appeals from a judgment in a
coverage case against them.ll4 Judge Parker found that there
was "a significant risk" that Fibreboard would lose on one or
more issues in the coverage case and that available funds under Fibreboard's current settlement program would be inadequate to pay all claims.115 Thus he concluded that the case

110. 1993 WL 767801 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 1993).
111. Id.
112. Id. at *2.
113. In Breast Implant, however, claimants against two defendants who were
in bankruptcy, Mentor and Bioplasty, were certified as non-opt-out subclasses. In re
Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 1994 W L 114580 at *3 (N.D. Ala. April 1,
1994).
114. Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corporation, 162 F.R.D. 505, 514-17 (E.D. Tex.
1995).
115. Id. at 526.

948

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995

was a "limited f u n d case justifying a mandatory class action
(which ruling has been appealed to the Fifth Circuit).
The certification of a mandatory class action is a powerful
mechanism for preventing duplicative litigation. The appellate
court in Skywalk found that it has the effect of an injunction
and therefore must come under an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.ll6 Judge Parker's mandatory class certification was
buttressed by an antisuit injunction providing class members a
powerful disincentive, enforceable by contempt, to litigate their
cases in any fashion outside the class action. The defendant in
Ahearn was thus assured, as much as is possible in the complex world of mass torts, of "total peace."'"
There are costs for such peace-the loss of parties' autonomy over their own cases and possible unfairness to individual
class members due to the "leveling effect" of a settlement. But
the billion-dollar terms of the three global settlements just
discussed arguably reflects a much greater willingness by defendants to make reasonable settlements if they can thereby
buy peace. For purposes of the narrow issues surrounding mandatory class actions and the constraints of the Anti-Injunction
Act, these global settlement cases reflect a growing willingness
of courts to squeeze cases into the "limited hnd" and "in aid of
its jurisdiction" categories to effect a pending settlement.
Federal courts have been struggling mightily to find a way
to hold together class-action settlements of mass related cases.
The tortured course of these rulings contrasts with the supposed simplicity of the antisuit injunction provision in the ALI
Proposal. However, some of the problems that have arisen in
the class-action context might also have to be faced in applying
the antisuit injunction in the consolidation scheme of the ALI
Proposal. Conversely, as an analogical development the Proposal might offer insights and examples to class-action courts in
exploring the appropriate boundaries of the antisuit injunction.

116. See supra text accompanying note 59; In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos
Litig., 120 B.R. 648, 655 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("The effect of conditional class
certification [under Rule 23(b)(l)(B)] will be for all pending state and federal cases
to become part of the mandatory class and cease to exist as independent cases.").
117. "[Iln return for the monies to be paid under the Global Settlement,
Fibreboard and the Insurers would receive 'total peace' with respect to any and all
claims, direct or indirect, involving the asbestos-related personal injury and death
claims of the class members." Ahearn, 162 F.R.D. at 517.
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11. NOTICEOF INTERVENTION
AND PRECLUSION
The second complementary device in the ALI Proposal-notice of intervention and preclusion-invokes quite different procedures and incentives than the antisuit injunction.
While the antisuit injunction is a threshold device prohibiting
the pursuit of litigation in other courts, the notice-of-intervention device focuses on precluding future similar claims by persons not parties to the aggregated suit. It contemplates potentially expanding the size of the aggregated suit by identifying
parties with an interest and notifying them of their right to
intervene and of the preclusive effect of the suit.

A. Unsuccessful Attempts to Curb Duplicative Litigation
with Preclusion
Preclusion has long been recognized as a possible way to
reduce duplicative litigation. Over the years there have been
various challenges to the general rule that persons may not be
precluded by a judgment if they were not joined as parties.
These challenges have taken the form of attempts to expand
the doctrines of "privies," "virtual representation," and other
exceptions to the general rule.ll8 Even these nonparty preclusion rules have been criticized as unduly narrow and as failing
to recognize that there are situations in which individuals
should be precluded without a right to participate as par~~
rejectties.llg ARer the 1979 decision in P ~ r k l a n e , 'which
ed the requirement of "mutuality" in cases of "offensive collateral estoppel" as to defendants who had a full and fair opportunity to litigate, some hoped to see an expansion of nonmutual
pre~lusion.'~~
In mass related cases, however, attempts to
preclude a common defendant from contesting jury findings
such as product defectiveness have foundered due to lack of
identity as to such matters as time, place, and evidence.122
118. See James R. Pielemeier, Due Process Limitations on the Application of
Collateral Estoppel Against Nonparties to Prior Litigation, 63 B.U. L. REV. 383,
387-415 (1983).
119. See Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal and Nonparty
Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 288 (1992) (concluding that courts should "ask
whether the absentee has any normative claim to participate a t all, and, if she
does, how strong her claim is and what sort of participation opportunities it demands").
120. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 US. 322 (1979).
121. See generally John C. McCoid, A Single Package for Multiparty Disputes,
28 STAN.L. REV. 707 (1976).
122. See, e.g., Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 343-45 (For-
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Finally, hopes of precluding persons who choose to "sit on the
fence" and not seek to intervene in a suit in which their interests might be affected were dashed by the Martin v. Wi1kslw
decision prohibiting preclusion without formal party status. In
response to Wilks, the ALI Proposal seeks to create a modest
vehicle for expanded nonparty preclusion.

B. ALI Proposal for Notice of Intervention and Preclusion
The ALI Proposal creates a new procedure to notify
nonparties, who might be affected by the judgment, of their
right to intervene. The notice provision builds on Justice
Harlan's comment in Provident Tradesmens that a person who
fails to intervene in an earlier lawsuit might "be bound by the
previous decision because, although technically a nonparty, he
ha[s] purposely bypassed an adequate opportunity to inter~ e n e . " 'As
~ ~the ALI Proposal notes, some courts flirted with
a rule of "nonparty preclusion," finding that nonparties who did
not take the initiative to intervene, despite knowledge that the
suit would affect their interests, would be precluded by the
judgment. 12' However, the decision in Wilk~'~~-whichheld
that nonparty white fire fighters were not bound by a judgment
between the department and a plaintiff class of black fire fighters, and that there is no duty to intervene to avoid preclusion-rejected such nonparty preclusion. In a footnote, however, Wilks left open the possibility of preclusion based on formal n 0 t i ~ e . l ~ ~
1. Notice procedure
The ALI Proposal creates a procedure for notifying
nonparties that they have a right to intervene, and that they
will be precluded by the judgment whether they do so or
not.'" The Proposal also details what the notice should con-

mer 5th Cir. 1982). But see Fraley v. American Cyanamid Co., 570 F. Supp. 497,
504 (D. Colo. 1983) (allowing plaintiff who contracted polio from a child who had
been vaccinated to assert collateral estoppel against the vaccine manufacturer).
123. 490 U.S.755 (1989).
124. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 114
(1968).
125. See COMPLEX LITIGATION
PROPOSAL, supra note 4, $ 5.05 cmt. a, n.3, at
280-81 (citing cases).
126. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
127. Id. at 762 n.2.
128. A somewhat similar approach was taken in the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
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tain. Nonparties must be informed of each of the following: the
nature of the claims to be resolved in the consolidated suit,
their right to intervene and the time period for doing so, that
whether they intervene or not they will benefit from the determinations made and will be precluded from relitigating issues,
and that they may contest whether the notice standards have
been satisfied.12' Upon receipt of notice, a nonparty can obtain a hearing on his claim that the standards have not been
satisfied and on whether the order should be confirmed, modified, or vacated.'"
The Proposal seems to contemplate only individual notice.
In so doing, it excludes some important potential uses of the
preclusion procedure. Individual notice may be feasible in an
employment discrimination suit of the Wilks variety. In such
cases, it is usually possible to obtain the names of white fire
fighters whose rights might be affected by a judgment. But the
raison d'6tre for the ALI project was to deal with mass related
litigation such as consumer rights, product liability, and toxic
torts cases. It is often impossible to identify by name and address all persons whose rights might be affected in such cases.
Such suits might be better resolved by a class action,l3' but
even under the Proposal's consolidation scheme, notice of intervention might in some cases play a useful role in facilitating
effective resolution through consolidation.
The question is whether notice might be given to a group
or organization or to a representative of a definable group of
persons in such a way as to adequately put members of the
group on notice of their right to intervene. Put another way,

42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-2(n)(l). In response to Wilks, that Act amended Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act to provide that "an employment practice that implements
and is within the scope of a litigated or consent judgment or order that resolves a
claim of employment discrimination" may not be challenged, under certain circumstances, by a person who received the specified form of notice and an adequate
opportunity to object or who was adequately represented. Id. The specified form of
notice that must be received is:
(I) actual notice of the proposed judgment or order sufficient to apprise
such person that such judgment or order might adversely affect the interests and legal rights of such person and that an opportunity was available to present objections to such judgment or order by a future date
certain.
42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-2(n)(l)(B)(i)(Supp. V 1989-1994).
PROPOSAL,supra note 4, 5 5.05(b).
129. COMPLEXLITIGATION
130. Id. 5 5.05(c).
131. See infia part 1I.C.
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could a class of nonparty potential intervenors be created which
would be notified through a named class representative? Perhaps this is simply another form of class action that should not
be confused with the notice-of-intervention device. But since
the ALI Proposal eschews consideration of class actions, one
wonders whether a broadened form of group, class, or representative notice of intervention should be explored for cases in
which individuals cannot easily be identified.
The Comments assert that it is expected that the notice
"procedure will be used only infiequently or for a small number
of litigants [as] most parties to complex litigation are likely to
have filed suit."13' This is a curious statement that sells short
the notice procedure's potential for preventing relitigation in
mass related cases. The largest mass related cases are often
protracted over many years, with suits continually being filed
over the life of the litigation.'" Even late in the life of mass
related litigation, there are often a sizable number of unfiled
claims. The notice-of-intervention procedure need not be limited
to consolidating or precluding claims that have already been
filed; the Comments state that the procedure "may be used to
gather the as yet unasserted claims of nonparties without regard to whether those claims otherwise would have been filed
in state or federal court."'34 The Comments, however, also
say that the procedure is limited to "existing claims and thus
does not provide a mechanism for addressing the problems of
duplication or inconsistency that may occur when claims mature later that involve the adjudication of some of the identical
facts."135
Could the notice-of-intervention device be used for claims
that have not yet matured? As was discussed in the previous
section, "futures" claims pose serious problems in aggregated
cases, and the fairness of resolving them through a representative action is being contested on appeal in Georgine and
Ahearn. Including "futures" claims in an aggregation or preclusion scheme raises serious questions as to the adequacy of
notice. Arguably, notice by publication is insufficient to satisfy
132. COMPLEX
LITTGATION
PROPOSAL,
supra note 4, 9 5.05 cmt. a, at 278.
133. See Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing
Complex Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 440, 482 (1986); In re Joint E. & S. Dists.
Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir.
1992), and modified on reh'g, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993).
134. COMPLEX
LITIGATION
PROPOSAL, supra note 4, 9 5.05 cmt. a, at 277.
135. Id.
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due process when the potential claimants are unaware of their
condition. This problem is magnified under the demanding due
process requirements of Wilks, if notice of intervention is used
as a basis for preclusion. On the other hand, in some cases,
notice by publication is likely to result in actual notice. For
example, persons exposed to a toxic substance may be well
aware of their exposure, and, through an effective publication
campaign or common knowledge, may also be aware of the
dangers incident to that exposure. Breast Implant Litigation
provides a good illustration; every class member was surely
aware that she had had an implant, and it is hard to believe
that, after the extensive media publication campaign, any class
member could have been unaware of the medical conditions
allegedly associated with an i m ~ 1 a n t . lIn
~ ~cases such as the
Breast Implant Litigation, in which class members are aware of
their potential claims, it might be possible to give as effective
notice by publication to future claimants as to present claimants. Thus, if an adequate form of notice of intervention by
publication could be devised in a proper case consolidated under the ALI Proposal, the notice procedure might be an effective device for dealing with one of the most vexing problems of
duplicative litigation-"futures" claims.
2. Rights upon intervening
Although the Proposal requires notice to potential intervenors, it does not address what rights persons will have if they
choose to intervene. Will intervenors be accorded full party
status with its attendant right to be represented by individual
counsel, to submit separate pleadings and motions, and to
address the court? If so, one would expect the notice-of- intervention procedure to be rarely invoked because intervenors
could quickly complicate a case and make it unmanageable.
Courts have not, in fact, granted full party status to intervenors. In United States v. Reserve Mining Co.,'" for example,
the judge ruled that various environmental, civic, business, and
governmental groups could intervene as of right. However, each

136. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant, 1994 WL 578353, at *3 (N.D.Ala.
Sept. 1, 1994) ("[Ulnlike some latent toxic-tort cases, this notice did not have to
serve the purpose of informing members of the public about whether they might
have claims. With rare exceptions, persons would know whether they were breastimplant recipients.").
137. 56 F.R.D. 408, 411 (D. Minn. 1972).
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side was required to "name a spokesman who will act as their
representative" and to work in unison to prevent duplication in
discovery, motions, calling of witnesses, and presentation of
evidence.138The attorneys for the original parties were designated as liaison counsel, controlling access to the court. In
Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action,13' the Supreme Court rejected arguments that the district court's grant
of permissive intervention contained too many restrictions.
These included prohibiting the intervenors from asserting a
claim for relief not already raised and from filing motions or
discovery without first conferring with the parties and obtaining permission from at least one of them.l4'
Restrictions of this kind would seem to be essential in the
mass related cases to which the ALJ Proposal is intended to
apply. However, at some point restrictions could amount to a
denial of due process, depriving the intervenor of litigant autonomy and effective control over the development and presentation of his case. Significant restrictions are even more troubling when, as under the &I Proposal, the intervenor has been
coerced into intervening on threat of being bound by the judgment, in contrast to the usual intervenor who intervenes on his
own motion.
A notice of intervention may not always have the expected
effect that a person will either intervene or choose not to and
accept the fact that he will be bound by the judgment. Instead,
notice may prompt a person to file suit in the forum of his
choice. Notice of intervention could thus have the unintended
effect of causing duplicative litigation. To prevent this result, a
court may have to resort to the other complementary device,
the antisuit injunction. In fact, it might be prudent for a court
to issue, simultaneously with notices of intervention, an
antisuit injunction forbidding all potential intervenors from
litigating in another forum any claims arising out of the same
matters.

138. Id. at 420.
139. 480 U.S. 370, 377-78 (1987).
140. Id.
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C. Developments in the Use of Preclusion in
Global Class-Action Settlements
The recent global settlements reveal increasingly sophisticated use of preclusion doctrines to estop nonparties from filing
future claims against the settling defendants. The ALI notice of
intervention and preclusion device has no direct relevance to
the use of preclusion in these global class-action settlements.
However, the ALI's recognition of a role for preclusion, accomplished through adequate notice, is consistent with the objectives of global settlements.
The three recent global settlements of massive class actions discussed in the previous section took different approaches to the use of preclusion. All three were mass tort suits
against the primary manufacturers of defective products. The
reality in each was that the settlement might not have been
achieved if the manufacturers could have been subjected to
later contribution claims by nonparties found liable to class
members on future claims arising out of exposure to the
manufacturers' products. How to resolve this concern became a
key aspect of achieving the global settlements.
1. Georgine: Precluding contribution claims of nonparties

One section of the Georgine settlement agreement prohibits
all nonparty contribution claims against the settling asbestos
manufacturer^.'^^ This provision precludes nonparties, such
as owners of premises containing asbestos, from seeking contribution from the defendants if the nonparties are sued by class
members for injuries resulting from exposure to defendants'
asbestos. Precluding the contribution rights of nonparties violates the principle that one who is not a party cannot be bound
by a judgment. This is one of the many possible grounds on
which Georgine might be appealed on the merits.'42 It is possible that there will be few contribution cases to raise an effective challenge to the preclusion provision because once class
members have received the benefits of the global settlement,
they may not be inclined to pursue more questionable claims

141. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 157 F.R.D. 246, 282-84 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
142. The case has been appealed interlocutorily to the Third Circuit on limited
grounds related to claimed error in the granting of the preliminary injunction. See
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 1995 W L 422792, at *3 (E.D. Pa. April 1, 1995); see
also supra note 98, and accompanying text.
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against third parties. Nevertheless, the purported loss of contribution rights is no small matter for nonparties. The desire to
free the settling defendants fkom the risk of contribution suits
is an understandable goal of the global settlement, but it is
hard to imagine how it can be upheld under these circumstances.

2. Breast Implant Litigation: A questionable bar order necessary to effect the settlement
The global settlement agreement in the Breast Implant
sought to preclude future claims by
~ i t i g a t i o n ' ~also
~
nonparties. The original agreement contained a sweeping "bar
order" precluding contribution or indemnity claims against the
settling defendants by nonparties who were sued by class
members?
Such nonparties would include doctors and
nonsettling manufacturers and suppliers. The agreement would
also preclude subrogation claims against the defendants by
nonparties such as insurance companies, hospitals, health
maintenance organizations, and governmental bodies which
had made payments to plaintiff class members. Prior to the
fairness hearing, Judge Pointer invited the nonparties to comment on or object to the proposed bar order. Several filed objections or moved to intervene.
In his final approval of the global settlement, Judge Pointer modified the bar order in relation to nonparties. He noted
that the agreement "shall not be viewed as precluding such
non-settling defendants from taking advantage of any rights of
setoff or credit, or similar rights to limit or reduce claims by
class members, otherwise available to them . . . under applicable state laws based on payments made to or for the benefit of
Thus nonparties
class members under this ~ettlement."'~~
could claim set-off rights against class members who might sue
them, but they remained subject to the bar order that precluded them from seeking contribution fkom the settling defendants
in the future. "[Tlhe bar order," Judge Pointer wrote, "is essential to the settlement, is fair and equitable, is supported by
adequate consideration, and is within the court's powers even
though these other manufacturers, suppliers, and health-care
143. See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
144. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 1994 WL 578353, at
*18 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994) (opinion tentatively approving settlement).
145. Id.
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providers have not agreed to the order or been named [as] parties."146
Judge Pointer likewise denied the nonparties' motion to
intervene. He conceded that "having been denied intervention,"
the nonparties could "be entitled to argue against any preclusive effect under the doctrine set forth in Martin v. W i l k ~ . " ' ~ ~
But he clearly believed the bar order was critical to obtaining
the defendants' agreement and was willing to leave "the merits
of [the Wilks] argument" to be "determined . . . by the court in
which i t is raised."'" Obviously the bar order might not be
upheld against the nonparties, but apparently the defendants
also preferred to defer that question until a later time.
On a note more positive for the nonparties, Judge Pointer
did refuse to approve provisions in the agreement precluding
the subrogation claims of nonparties against the settlement
fund and class members. The nonparties, he observed, could
not be deprived of their rights to present their claims or "to
pursue and perhaps intercept" the "benefits that may become
payable to individual members of the class."'49 Nonetheless,
he approved the preclusion of all future subrogation claims
against the defendants, again favoring total peace for the settling defendants over nonparty rights.
3. Ahearn: Accomplishing preclusion through a third-party
class action

The global settlement in ~hearn'~'seems to have benefited from the experience of the prior settlements in Georgine
and the Breast Implant Litigation. It recognized that to ensure
certain and effective preclusion of contribution claims, the
potential claimants should be before the court. The settlement
accomplished this by providing for a third-party defendant
class of all persons and entities that might have claims for contribution and indemnity against the defendant Fibreboard. This
class included owners of premises containing Fibreboard asbestos, manufacturers of materials containing Fibreboard asbestos
as component parts, and others who might be sued in the future by persons exposed to Fibreboard asbestos. A large corpo-

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at *19.
Id.
Id.
Id.
162 F.R.D.505 (E.D.Tex. 1995).
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ration, Owens-Illinois, was named as class representative and
ultimately, on behalf of the class, it agreed to settle all future
claims the class might have against Fibreboard. In exchange
the third-party defendant class received certain benefits and
concessions.151
Use of a third-party class action to preclude future contribution rights seems a wise choice. Of course, the class representative may not find it in the class's interests to agree to the
preclusion of contribution rights as the representative did in
Ahearn. Nonetheless, the third-party procedure is beneficial
because it empowers the third-party class representative to
bargain for terrns that would benefit the class members.
Under the settlement in Ahearn, third-party class
members' rights under state law to set-offs and credits against
any asbestos victim who sued them would be preserved. The
lengthy settlement agreement contained provisions to assure
that the varying requirements of state laws for set-offs and
credits would be satisfied. Thus, if a third party were sued by a
plaintiff class member and found liable, the third party would
be entitled to set off against the judgment, if the state law so
provided, any money the class member had received from the
Fibreboard Trust under the settlement. Similarly, if a plaintiff
class member obtained a judgment against a third party before
the plaintiff had obtained payment from the trust, the third
party would succeed to the plaintiffs' interests against the
trust. In addition, the agreement contained provisions intended
to assure that the trust would not be depleted: caps on the
plaintiff class's attorneys' fees, prohibitions against punitive
damages and prejudgment interest, and spendthrift provisions
to keep the trust solvent. Further, the agreement ensured that
if third-party class members were sued by a plaintiff, they
would be entitled to obtain discovery free of charge from the
Fibreboard trust as to any evidence relating to the plaintiffs
claim against the trust.'"
At a fairness hearing, Judge Parker found that these provisions were reasonable and fair to the third-party class and that
the benefits gained by the class justified precluding its members from filing future suits for contribution against

151. Id. at 518-20.
152. These provisions are contained in the Submission of Global Settlement
Agreement, Trust Distribution Process and Defendant Class Settlement Agreement
(Dec. 23, 1993), in Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., Civ. Ac. No. 6:93cv526 (E.D. Tex.).

9251

DUPLICATIVE LITIGATION

959

F i b r e b ~ a r d . 'The
~ ~ Ahearn agreement is the kind of arrangement that other global settlements might look to as a model. It
goes far in establishing the settlement class action as a suitable device for buying defendants true peace in mass related
suits without compromising the rights of third parties.
111. CONCLUSION
The ALI Proposal's provisions for antisuit injunctions and
notice of intervention and preclusion are appropriate and necessary complements to its aggregation scheme. The procedures
are reasonable, although consideration has not been given to a
number of problems and potential uses. The Proposal seems
unlikely to become law soon, but it provides a useful example
of creative applications of devices which might be looked to by
courts faced with mass duplicative litigation. In the end, the
application of these and similar devices in the class-action context seems the most promising way to deal with the problem of
duplicative litigation.

153. Ahearn, 162 F.R.D. at 519-20.

